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Abstract 
Blame is an important social act that evolved to become an integral part of social regulation. 
Blame is associated with significant social costs for the person facing blame (e.g., social 
isolation, punishment) as well as for the person expressing blame (e.g., criticism if blame is 
improperly given).  Because of these social costs, blame must be justified or warranted by the 
perpetrators mental states or the severity of the outcome. The current study suggests that 
power is a role constraint that will uniquely affect public blame while leaving private blame 
unaffected. Data show that when confronting moral violations people may privately blame as 
they please; however, deciding when and how to express public blame is constrained by 
social status and power.  
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Seething but Quiet: Power Differentially Affects Public vs. Private  
Expressions of Blame 
 
People face social interactions every day and sometimes these interactions include 
dealing with moral violations. Moral violations can range from something relatively small 
(e.g., someone stealing a pack of pens from work) to something more severe (e.g., a 
politician embezzling money). When moral violations occur, who and how to blame must be 
determined; however, it is not uncommon for these blame judgments to appear different 
across people. For example, famous TV personalities or major newscasters may loudly 
proclaim a politician as corrupt while a neighbor or coworker might appear to be indifferent 
towards the situation. The current study will investigate what might cause this difference in 
blame judgments. 
Social Importance of Blame 
 Blame is an important social act that evolved to become an integral part of social 
regulation. Blame allows humans to regulate others’ behaviors so they align with community 
interests and social expectations for sharing, reciprocity, self-control, and recognition of 
others. One prominent model that describes how people make moral judgments is the Path 
Model of Blame (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014 ). According to this model, people 
move through a number of information processing steps rights and vulnerabilities (Malle et 
al., 2014). 
The first step in this model is detection of a norm-breaking event. People are quick to 
evaluate events that deviate from their own beliefs or norms (Van Berkum, Holleman, 
Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009), and while this detection is mandatory in the process of 
blaming, it can be done without appointing blame. For example, people might believe that a 
behavior was bad, but not blameworthy (e.g., killing in self-defense). Once perceivers detect 
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a norm violation, they consider who caused the outcome (Cushman, 2008; Lagnado & 
Channon, 2008) and whether the causal agent is a morally eligible agent (Guglielmo, 
Monroe, & Malle, 2009). A baby might cause crayon marks on a wall, but most people 
would agree that a baby is not morally eligible to be blamed because the baby doesn’t 
understand that the behavior was wrong.  
Once a causal agent has been deemed morally eligible, intentionality is assessed. The 
concept of intentionality in adults is composed of five components: desire, belief, intention, 
skill, and awareness (Malle & Knobe, 1997). While intentionality is composed of these five 
components, people do not deliberate these components every time they make a moral 
judgment, but rather quickly calculate intentionality (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). 
Lastly, for intentional acts people consider a person’s reasons and justifications for acting. 
Undesirable actions are often fueled by unpleasant reasons, however an action that is deemed 
justified (e.g., standing up against a bully) is blamed less (Howe, 1991). For unintentional 
behaviors people consider a person’s obligation (e.g., should they have prevented the event) 
and capacity (e.g., could they have prevented the event) to prevent the event are considered. 
If the agent should of, and could of, prevented the event, blame could still be assigned even if 
the event was unintentional.  
Critical to this model are two assumptions. First, that people can move through the 
process of blaming as outlined above quickly and intuitively. Thus people need not 
consciously reflect on every step of the model.  Seeing a person laughing happily while 
holding a smoking gun over a corpse would allow people to fill in all of the information 
needed to make a blame judgment without having to spend time on reflection.   
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The second critical assumption is that blame originated, and still functions, as a social 
regulator. Blame is associated with significant social costs for the person facing blame (e.g., 
social isolation, punishment) as well as for the person expressing blame (e.g., criticism if 
blame is improperly given).  Because of these social costs, blame must be justified or 
warranted by the perpetrators mental states or the severity of the outcome. When people are 
blamed without warrant, they perceive events to be more immoral and have a more negative 
effect on personal relationships (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998). Because of these 
social costs there is an important distinction between blame judgments that people make 
privately compared to publicly expressed judgments.  
Private vs. public blame  
Voiklis and Malle (2016) created a model for processes of social and moral cognition 
in the context of social regulation of norm violations. Once a perceiver arrives at a private 
blame judgment, he or she must decide whether public moral criticism is warranted. At this 
point if warrant meets the threshold (and this threshold can vary across people and 
situations), public blame or criticism is likely to be delivered. Public judgments of blame 
must be warranted because of the social cost of blaming and being blamed (e.g., damaged 
reputation, the possibility of reactive aggression), thus people may be reluctant to express 
blame if they feel the judgment is not sufficiently warranted. Contrastingly, private judgment 
of blame does not face the same level of scrutiny (because they exist only in one’s head), and 
therefore one can blame privately as much as one likes. Voiklis and Malle (2016) 
hypothesized that other considerations, such as role constraints may inhibit public blame 
judgments and criticism. The current study suggests that power is one such role constraint 
that will uniquely affect public blame while leaving private blame unaffected. 
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Social Power and its Behavioral Effects 
Power has been defined in a variety of ways; some definitions focus on the ability to 
socially influence others, while other definitions are focused on where power is located and 
distributed, or the experience of feeling power (e.g., emotional experience) (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). French and Raven (1959) suggest that power consists of the 
following bases: reward-, coercive-, legitimate-, expert-, and referential-power. Reward 
power is thought to come from the perception that an agent has the ability to mediate rewards 
(e.g., if goals are reached, one receives an end-of-year bonus). Coercive power is similar to 
reward based power; the difference stems from the expectation of punishment if there is a 
failure to conform (e.g., if goals are not reached, one is fired) rather than expectation of 
rewards. Legitimate power, sometimes also referred to as authority power, draws from the 
perception that an agent has a legitimate right to influence others. The legitimate right to 
influence is followed by an obligation to accept this influence (e.g., parents restricting their 
child's activities). Expert power is given when an agent is thought to have special knowledge 
or expertise (e.g., an IT specialist fixing a computer). Referent power is drawn from 
identification, or feeling of oneness, with an agent or group (e.g., charismatic leader who 
makes others feel comfortable in their presence). Maner, Kaschak, and Jones (2010) describe 
power as the ability to influence the outcomes of other people. Similarly, Keltner et al. 
(2003) define power as an individual's capacity to modify others states by providing or 
withholding resources or administering punishment; in this case, both resources and 
punishment can be material or social. Importantly, common across all of these definitions is a 
view that power involves the ability to influence others. 
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Power is often seen as the force behind displays of actions, such that individuals with 
power are more action oriented than those without power, even when power is not directly 
experienced (Galinksy, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Further, some research suggests, that the 
effects of power may spill into the moral domain. For example, people with power are more 
likely to violate politeness-related communication norms (Brown & Levinson, 1987) or to 
behave in hostile ways (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001).  
Galinsky et al. (2003) specifically studied if concepts and behavioral tendencies 
associated with power are activated whenever possession of power is implied or when a past 
experience is recalled. The first experiment found that participants who possessed structural 
power in a group task were more likely to act than those who did not have power, even 
though power and action were two different contexts in this study. In experiment two, 
participants were asked to recall a situation where they either possessed power over someone 
else, or in which someone else possessed power over them. Participants primed with high 
power were more likely to act against an annoying stimulus, suggesting that the experience 
of power leads to goal-directed behavior. The final experiment showed that priming high 
power (in the same way as experiment two) led to action in a social situation regardless of 
whether that action had prosocial or antisocial consequences.  
Maner et al. (2010) looked further into power influencing action and found that not 
only does power raise approach-oriented tendencies (e.g., positive affect, attention to 
rewards, socially inappropriate behavior), but it also has a direct effect on low level processes 
in the motor system. Priming power made participants more likely to move their hand closer 
to the immediate environment when responding to auditory cues. These effects on action are 
thought to be largely influenced by power activating behavioral approach systems. Further, 
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Keltner et al. (2003) showed that individuals with high power show positive affect, attention 
to rewards, automatic information processing, and disinhibited behavior, while those with 
low power show negative affect, attention to punishment/others interests, controlled 
information processing, and inhibited social behavior.  
Together, the previous research shows that power has a significant impact on 
behavioral tendencies such as approach orientation, affect, and information processing. 
However, while the existing work clearly demonstrates the effect of power increasing 
approach motivations in non-moral domains, it remains unclear whether power would have a 
similar effect on decisions of moral import such as publicly expressing moral judgments of 
blame.  
The Current Experiment  
The current study will investigate the role power plays in private and public blame 
decisions. Our hypothesis is rooted in Voiklis and Malle’s (2016) model for processes of 
social and moral cognition. Based on this model and other research discussed, we 
hypothesize that private judgments about blame will be high and consistent across power 
conditions (high, low, and control) because it is not subject to scrutiny from peers. By 
contrast, we predict that power will intensify people’s expressions of public blame relative to 
low power or control. Previous research suggests that power increases approach oriented 
tendencies (e.g., positive affect, attention to rewards, socially inappropriate behavior), which 
suggests that people with high power are more likely to express what others hold in 
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007).  
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Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 189) were undergraduate students from Appalachian State 
University who were completing studies for credit. The sample was largely composed of 
females (n = 140), and the average age in the sample was 19.6 years (SD = 1.37). The 
majority of participants identified as White (83.6%), with fewer participants identifying as 
African American (5.8%), Asian (5.3%), Latin/Hispanic (3.7%), Middle Eastern (1.1%), or 
Native American (.5%).   
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were tested in a lab setting in groups of one to three. Before beginning 
the study, participants signed an informed consent and were given time to ask questions. 
Participants were told that they would be completing two separate studies. The experimenter 
informed participants that the first study was a pilot study on student experiences.  The power 
manipulation was embedded in this first task. Using the same manipulation task as Galinsky 
et al. (2003), participants were randomly assigned to one of three writing tasks: high-power, 
low-power, and control. Participants assigned to the high power condition (n = 64) were 
asked to write about a situation where they controlled the ability of another person or persons 
to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those individuals. Participants 
in the low-power condition (n = 65) were asked to recall a time when someone else had 
control over your ability to get something you wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. 
Finally, participants in the control condition (n = 60) were asked to write about an activity 
that they do every day.  
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After participants completed the writing task, participants were told that they had 
completed the first study and would move on to the other study which focused on making 
judgments of others. Participants were told that they would read about two participants 
(Andy and Jon) who played an economic game in a previous laboratory experiment. The 
game the Andy and Jon played was described as follows: 
Each player was paid $5 for participating in the experiment, but could increase their 
earnings by playing a game where they could contribute money to a shared pool. 
Whatever money they contributed to the pool would be multiplied by 4, split, and 
then returned to the players. If one player contributes $0 to the pool, but the other 
player contributes at least $1, then the person who contributed $0 gets all of the 
money. If both players contribute $0 neither of them wins any money AND they lose 
the $5 they started out with. Each player made their contribution decision 
confidentially; however, players were allowed to chat using an instant messaging 
program before making their decisions. 
Participants then read a supposed transcript of a text conversation between Andy and Jon. In 
the conversation Andy and Jon each agree to contribute all of their $5 stake to the pool; 
however, after Jon makes his contribution decision, Andy defects, winning the game, and 
resulting in Jon losing his $5. 
After reading the scenario, participants responded to two questions (in a 
counterbalanced order): (1) participants were asked, to rate, privately, how much blame they 
thought Andy deserved on a 1 (no blame at all) to 9 (extreme blame) Likert scale, and (2), 
participants responded to an open-ended question where they were asked to describe what 
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they would say to Andy if they saw him face-to-face. Afterwards, participants completed a 
demographics questionnaire and were then thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
The current study tested two hypotheses. In line with Voiklis and Malle (2016), we 
predicted that feeling powerful would intensify people’s expressions of public blame relative 
to the low-power or control conditions. Contrastingly, we predicted that private blame 
judgments, because they are unobservable, would be high and consistent across conditions. 
Prior to analyses, two RAs who were blind to condition coded the open-ended responses for 
the public blame question (α = .95). We then conducted a one way to examine the effects of 
power on the severity of participants’ expressions of public blame. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant effect of power on public blame; F(2, 188) = 9.25, p < .001, d = .63 (see Figure 
1). A Tukey post hoc test indicated that public blame in the high power condition was 
significantly harsher compared to both the low power condition (p < .001) and the control 
condition (p =.001); however, there was not a significant difference between the low power 
and control conditions (p =.97). By contrast, examining the effect of power on private blame 
showed that manipulating power did not significantly affect private blame F(2, 188) = 1.83, p 
=.163 (See Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Power increased people’s willingness to express public blame toward third parties 
relative to control and low power conditions. Error bars = ±1 SE. 
 
 
Figure 2. Private blame remained strong and constant across the power manipulation 
conditions. Error bars = ±1 SE. 
 
Discussion 
The current study examined the effect of power on moral behavior, specifically, how 
power affects private versus public blame judgments. The data show that priming people 
with high power intensified expressions of public blame: what people would actually say or 
do to a person committing a moral transgression. Contrastingly, private blame judgments 
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remained severe across conditions (control, low power, high power). These findings support 
our hypotheses that while power appears to unleash public expressions of blame, private 
blame judgments remain unaffected.  
One explanation for these findings is that the social constraints on public judgments 
of blame, namely needing to produce judgments that are warranted (i.e., justified), limit 
people’s willingness to publicly express blame. When blame is inappropriately expressed, 
there can be major social costs (e.g., loss of face, loss of status, reactive aggression). Power 
may allow people to expresses public blame because it allows people to feel more confident 
and justified in their judgments (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et 
al., 2001; Keltner et al., 2003; Maner et al., 2010). That is, being high power, even 
temporarily, may make people more confident that the level of blame they are expressing is 
appropriate.  While the present studies do not test this possibility, ongoing work in the lab 
will examine whether this greater sense of justification is associated with willingness to 
express harsher public expressions of blame.  For example, we will collect ratings of 
“rightness” or appropriateness of public blame. If high-power people perceive their own 
social blaming as more right or appropriate compared to low-power people, that would be a 
first piece of evidence that power increases feelings of warrant, which in turn disinhibits 
public expressions of blame. 
Additionally, future work should consider possible moderators of our effect. Power is 
not static but interacts with contextual factors, culture, and individual difference variables 
(Keltner et al., 2003). For example, one potential moderator is whether power is solid versus 
tenuous (e.g., if the position is easily overthrown). One might predict that when power is 
solid, public blame will be harsher because there are little to no repercussions for 
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inappropriate actions. By contrast, when power is tenuous, blame judgments might be kept 
private because of the possibility of power being taken away or status removed.   
The current study found that those with power are more likely to express feelings of 
blame, which may allow them to have their opinion heard and frustrations released. On the 
other hand, those with low power appear to hold feelings of frustration or anger in, and may 
perceive that their opinions do not matter. The difference in ability to healthily express 
frustration may differentially affect workplace satisfaction, such that those who do not 
express frustration are less likely to feel satisfied than those that actively express their 
annoyance. In order to combat this possible effect, human resource departments could focus 
on developing environments where all members feel comfortable voicing frustrations in a 
healthy manner.  
Overall, we know that people face social interactions every day, and sometimes these 
interactions include dealing with moral violations. Moral violations can range from 
something relatively small (e.g., someone stealing a pack of pens from work) to something 
more severe (e.g., a politician embezzling money). The present work demonstrates that when 
confronting these moral violations people may privately blame as they please; however, 
deciding when and how to express public blame is constrained by social status and power. 
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